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INTRODUCTION
Bias, disparate treatment, and racism are embedded into the U.S.
criminal legal system. African Americans, Latinx, and other people of
color are more likely to be stopped by police,1 arrested,2 and serve time
in custody after being charged.3 Overall, the United States incarcerates
more people and has a higher rate of incarceration than any other
country in the world.4 On any given day over 2.3 million people are
incarcerated in the United States,5 and over 7 million are under some
kind of carceral control including jail, prison, probation, or parole.6 Racial
and ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented in all of these
numbers.7 A key player within the criminal legal system that could
dramatically reduce or eliminate these disparities are prosecutors.
Prosecutors enjoy extraordinary power and they exercise that power with
few constraints. For most defendants the single most important
prosecutorial decision, after charging, is the plea offer. Over 90% of all
criminal convictions are due to plea bargains.8 Yet, there are virtually no

1. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., SUSPECT CITIZENS: WHAT 20 MILLION
TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE (2018) (examining 14 years of data of
traffic stops in North Carolina and concluding that African American drivers were 63%
more likely to be stopped while driving and 115% more likely to be searched than white
drivers).
2. Anagha Srikanth, Black People Five Times More Likely to Be Arrested Than Whites,
According to New Analysis, HILL (June 11, 2020), https://thehill.com/changingamerica/respect/equality/502277-black-people-5-times-more-likely-to-be-arrested-thanwhites.
3. WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUST., TRENDS IN CORRECTIONAL
CONTROL BY RACE AND SEX 4–5 (2019), available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/
counciloncj.org/resource/collection/4683B90A-08CF-493F-89ED-A0D7C4BF7551/Trends
_in_Correctional_Control_-_FINAL.pdf (stating that African American and Latinx
incarceration rate disparities have declined, but at both the state and federal level
disparities remain).
4. See, e.g., Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global
Context 2018, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
global/2018.html (stating that the United States incarcerates 698 per 100,000 people).
5. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Lech Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census:
State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28,
2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html.
8. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas.”). For other data, see Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2021]

BARGAINING WITHOUT BIAS

11/11/2021 1:07 PM

1339

limitations on prosecutors during the plea bargaining stage and
relatively little attention given to how standard plea bargaining practices
can exacerbate bias.9 What happens at the plea bargaining stage,
whether a case is dismissed, charged as a misdemeanor, charged as a
felony, or charged as a felony with additional enhancements, will change
the direction of defendant’s life in far-reaching ways. A criminal
conviction could prevent, or make it harder to get, a job.10 A criminal
conviction can result in deportation.11 A criminal conviction can make it
harder, or impossible, to get certain professional licenses. 12 A criminal
conviction may make it harder to rent an apartment or live within certain
areas.13 A criminal conviction can make the punishment in any future
criminal conviction worse due to enhancements or habitual offender
laws.14 The prosecutor is the key decision maker and, unfortunately,
standard prosecutorial practices can exacerbate the biases that are
already embedded into the criminal legal system.15 There are multiple
challenges that make it difficult for prosecutors to reduce or eliminate
their biases.16
The first core problem is that plea bargaining is largely unsupervised
and prosecutors have extraordinary power and virtually unlimited
discretion in the process. Prosecutors regularly engage in hard
bargaining tactics and there is no meaningful check on prosecutorial bias
in deciding what offers to make on what cases. The second core problem
is that plea bargaining can exacerbate racial disparities and bias. The
third core problem is that once a case comes into the criminal legal
system, and the case is charged, a prosecutor’s first offer acts as an
anchor in the negotiation, regardless of whether the offer reflects bias.
Unlike in other negotiation contexts, the defendant in a criminal case has
no meaningful option to counter or walk away from the prosecutor’s offer.

and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 545
(2004).
9. For exceptions, see infra Section II.
10. Christine Neylon O’Brien & Jonathan J. Darrow, Adverse Employment
Consequences Triggered by Criminal Convictions: Recent Cases Interpret State Statutes
Prohibiting Discrimination, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 991, 994–95 (2007).
11. Joshua Gallo, Counsel Must Advise Their Clients When Criminal Conviction Would
Result in Deportation: Padilla v. Kentucky, 2 DUQ. CRIM. L.J. 93, 93 (2001).
12. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.78 (West 2020).
13. Renting with a Criminal Conviction or Arrest Record, TENANT RES. CTR.,
https://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/renting_with_a_criminal_conviction (last visited
Aug. 10, 2021).
14. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West 2008).
15. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct,
23 CRIM. JUST. 24 (2008).
16. Id.
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In this article, to work towards decreasing bias in plea bargaining, I
propose a structural fix and an individual fix to these core problems. The
structural fix is that prosecutors’ offices should adopt policies for blind
assessment of cases when the first plea offer is made. All indicia of race
or ethnicity (including names and neighborhoods) should be removed
when prosecutors review a case and make the initial plea offer. This
would help prosecutors focus on the facts and their evidence when
making a plea offer and prevent bias in decision making. However, it is
not realistic to expect that prosecutors, even in offices that adopt blind
charging and plea bargaining policies, would remain blind to who the
individual defendant is in all cases. Therefore, the individual fix is to
train prosecutors on empathy. Prosecutors’ offices should expand and
improve training and programs on empathy to change how prosecutors
view defendants. People tend to have empathy for, and in the criminal
context give the benefit of the doubt to, those who are “more like them”—
including being the same race and socio-economic group. 17 Empathy for
others is a skill that can be taught, like trial skills, negotiation, or
writing.18 Prosecutors’ offices need to include empathy skills as an
integral part of their overall training. Improved empathy skills would
help prosecutors to stop looking at defendants as simply “criminals”19—
a label that is often racially-based. Instead, more prosecutors could learn
to see defendants, in the words of Bryan Stevenson, as “more than the
worst thing” they have ever done.20
I. PLEA BARGAINING IS LARGELY UNSUPERVISED
Prosecutors enjoy extraordinary power in the criminal legal system
in the United States.21 There are few meaningful checks on their

17. See, e.g., JOHAN M.G. VAN DER DENNEN, Of Badges, Bonds and Boundaries:
Ingroup/Outgroup Differentiation and Ethnocentrism Revisited, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF
ETHNOCENTRISM 17 (Vernon Reynold et al. eds., 1987). In some circumstances, this can
mean more empathy for the victim who may be from their same race or ethnic group than
for the defendant. This can be particularly problematic in the context of capital cases. See
Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Threat Versus Racial Empathy in Sentencing—Capital and
Otherwise, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6–8 (2013).
18. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
19. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 15 (2014).
20. Id. at 17–18.
21. For a longer discussion of prosecutorial power, see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 582–87 (2014) (hereinafter The Impact of Lafler and Frye); see
also Davis, supra note 15, at 27–30 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and how prosecutors
can misuse this power).
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discretion.22 Prosecutors decide what charges to file or to bring to a grand
jury.23 Criminal codes in every state and federally allow prosecutors to
choose between a wide variety of crimes for substantially similar acts. 24
They can decide to file a case as a misdemeanor or a felony.25 Prosecutors
decide what enhancements to add, 26 including adding a gun or prior
conviction charge.27 Judges have limited power to dismiss charges.28
Well over ninety percent of all criminal convictions are due to plea
bargaining.29 Prosecutors enjoy extraordinary and virtually unchecked
discretion in the plea-bargaining process.30 They can decide to drop
charges and enhancements in exchange for a plea deal.31 Prosecutors
decide what the sentence will be, including how much jail or prison
time.32 The defendant is, of course, free to reject the plea deal. But, due
to the trial penalty, defendants often face serious risks of much heavier
penalties if they reject the plea offer.33 The judge could also reject the
22. See, e.g., Alkon, The Impact of Lafler and Frye, supra note 21, at 583–87.
23. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 409 (2001); CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER
SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 31–45 (2009); see also G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA
BARGAINING 28 (3d ed. 2012).
24. See HERMAN, supra note 23, at 28.
25. Id.; see also id. at 203–04 (recommending that legislatures reduce the number of
crimes that can be charged as both misdemeanors and felonies to reduce prosecutorial
power).
26. See Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming
the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 UNIV. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS, 191, 194–95 (2015) (hereinafter An Overlooked Key to
Reversing Mass Incarceration).
27. Id. at 207.
28. See Alkon, The Impact of Lafler and Frye, supra note 22, at 615.
29. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
30. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 23, at 409; Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea
Bargaining: When do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 403–06 (2017)
(suggesting that it is time to restrict some prosecutorial hard bargaining practices)
(hereinafter Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining).
31. See HERMAN, supra note 23, at 104–06.
32. See Davis, supra note 23, at 409.
33. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to four
hundred sixty-one percent, depending on the state and the offense); Russell Covey,
Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 213, 224–30 (2007) (discussing that the actual trial penalty could be
substantially higher due to the fact that most statistics compare the sentence for similar
charges and do not consider the fact that plea bargains often include pleading guilty to a
lesser offense than the one originally charged); see also Berthoff v. United States, 140 F.
Supp. 2d 50, 67–68 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Evidence of sentencing disparity visited on those who
exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is today stark, brutal, and
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plea deal.34 But, there is no right to a plea deal, which means that it is
entirely up to the prosecutor whether they will offer a deal or not. 35
A. The Process of Plea Bargaining
There is no set process for plea bargaining. In general, when a plea
offer is made, it is made early in the case, often at or before
arraignment.36 In some jurisdictions, the offer may be included with
electronic discovery and made not only before the first court appearance,
but also before the first conversation between the defense lawyer and the
prosecutor and even before the first conversation between a defense
lawyer and their client.37 Once an offer is made, the defendant may
decide to accept it or the defense lawyer may make a counter offer. In
some cases, usually in more serious cases, the first offer is not made until
after the arraignment, as the prosecutor wants a chance to review the
evidence, which may include talking to witnesses.38 After this deeper
assessment of the case, a prosecutor may decide to make an offer or
decide that the case should proceed without any offer. 39 Not making a
plea offer is more common in more serious cases, particularly murder
cases.40
A criminal case that does not settle at arraignment may be handled
by a number of prosecutors as it works its way towards trial. Some

incontrovertible.”); JAMIE FELLNER ET AL., HUM. RTS. WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T
REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY
(2013) (showing examples on how the trial penalty can be used to coerce defendants to
accept plea deals); see also The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the
Verge of Extinction and How to Save it, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (July 10, 2018),
www.nacdl.org/trialpenaltyreport.
34. HERMAN, supra note 23, at 111.
35. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142 (2012) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 561 (1977)).
36. Steven Zeidman, Eradicating Assembly-Line Justice, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293, 293
(2017).
37. See id. at 293–94.
38. See Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years
After Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407, 412–13 (2014).
39. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 1303, 1338–39 (2018).
40. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T JUST., STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 19902002: VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES (2006), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/
pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf.; DISTRICT AND STATUTORY COUNTY COURTS FELONY CASE ACTIVITY
DETAIL: SEPTEMBER 1, 2018 TO AUGUST 31, 2019, TEX. CTS. 2–3, https://www.txcourts.gov/
media/1445369/felony_activity_detail-2019.pdf. In Texas in 2018-2019, 96.27% of felony
drug possession convictions were due to a guilty plea, compared to 63.39% of murder cases
and 30.08% of capital murder cases. Id. (stating that a higher percentage of murder
convictions are from trials than for other felonies).
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prosecutors’ offices are small, so the cases will not be handed over to other
lawyers within the office.41 Some kinds of cases, such as sexual assault
and murder cases, are commonly vertically prosecuted, which means
they will be handled by the same prosecutor from arraignment through
sentencing.42
If the prosecution makes an offer and the defense does not like it, but
they want to plead guilty, they can decide to plead “open” to the judge in
hopes of a better deal. 43 This could involve the defense lawyer asking the
judge for an indicated sentence, if the defendant pleads open. Some
jurisdictions, including the Federal system, prohibit any conversation
between the judge and lawyers about plea deals.44 Putting aside this less
common option, the defendant is usually left with two choices: accept
what the prosecutor is offering or go to trial.
B. Limits on Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining
There are virtually no limits on prosecutorial power in plea
bargaining. As discussed above, prosecutors can decide to make an offer
or not.45 Subject to judicial approval, they can decide what that offer is, 46
including whether the charge is a felony or a misdemeanor. They can
threaten to add additional charges if the defendant rejects the plea
offer.47 They can threaten to add enhancements if the defendant rejects
the plea deal.48
41. See Steven M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests, 105 NW.
L. REV. 261, 266 (2001).
42. For an example from San Joaquin County, California, see Vertical Prosecution, SAN
JOAQUIN
CNTY.
DIST.
ATT’Y
OFF.,
https://www.sjgov.org/da/units/verticalprosecution#:~:text=This%20vertical%20prosecution%20system%20means,the%20prosecu
tion%20of%20the%20crime (last visited June 27, 2021) (“Deputy District Attorneys in this
Division prosecute cases vertically. This means that they are assigned cases immediately
after the initial referral and are responsible for those cases to final disposition by trial or
plea. This vertical prosecution system means that one prosecutor will usually stay with the
case from start to finish, better serving the victims, witnesses and law enforcement officials
involved in the prosecution of the crime. The types of cases handled in this manner
include Homicide, Gangs, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse & Sexual Assault, Child
Abduction, Human Trafficking, and Sexually Violent Predators.”).
43. See generally Alan Ellis & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Plea Bargained vs. Open Pleas:
What the Data Reveal, 31 NO. 7 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 1 (2017).
44. HERMAN, supra note 23, at 111; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
45. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142 (2012) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 561 (1977)).
46. See HERMAN, supra note 23, at 28.
47. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750–51 (1970); Alkon, supra note 30, at
409–11.
48. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–51; Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining, supra
note 30, at 408–09.
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The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutors must honor their
plea agreement after the defendant has accepted it.49 But, otherwise, the
Court has not limited how plea bargaining is conducted. 50 Prosecutors
are free to engage in hard bargaining tactics such as putting extreme
time pressures on offers—and taking offers off the table if defendants do
not accept within a limited time.51 Prosecutors can make take-it-or-leave
it offers and not engage in any meaningful negotiation.52
The main constraint on prosecutorial power in plea bargaining is
within the prosecutor’s office.53 Prosecutors tend to work in hierarchical
offices and are often limited by office policies.54 The District Attorney
could decide, for example, to dismiss all marijuana cases, or demand
mandatory time in jail for repeat Driving Under the Influence offenses.55
Prosecutors working in such an office would have to make sure that their
plea offers comply with the stated policies.
II. RACIAL DISPARITIES ARE EXACERBATED IN PLEA BARGAINING
Prosecutors enjoy extraordinary power and, like most people, they
have explicit and implicit biases.56 Implicit bias is defined as
49. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”).
50. See Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining, supra note 30, at 401 (arguing
that the Supreme Court should “limit prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics in plea
negotiations”).
51. Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining, supra note 30, at 406–08.
52. Id. at 411–13.
53. Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
54. Id. (“In other instances, internal rules derive from explicit philosophies or policies
created by the chief prosecutor and enforced through internal, supervisory structures.”).
55. See id. at 7 (“[O]ffice policies . . . may require a specific charge or sentence in a plea
offer regardless of the strength of the evidence.”).
56. See BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., DO RACE AND ETHNICITY
MATTER IN PROSECUTION?: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 17 (2012) (“[P]rosecutorial
decision making is associated with racial and ethnic disparities in case outcomes.”); see also
Christopher Robertson et al., Race and Class: A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors,
16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 807, 810–11, 815 (2019) (“While there are a few outliers, most
of the empirical studies on race and prosecutorial decision making have concluded that
racial bias exists . . . .”). The experiment conducted by Professor Robertson and his
coauthors, however, suggested that the issue of bias extended beyond the prosecutors
themselves. Id. at 847. It found that the “huge racial and socioeconomic disparities in
criminal justice outcomes . . . [are not] primarily due to implicit biases by prosecutors,”
suggesting that “more fundamental and structural solutions” are needed to “address
systemic and institutionalized racism and classism.” Id. Of course, other professionals in
the criminal legal system also suffer from bias. See, e.g., Jeff Adachi, Public Defenders Can
Be Biased, Too, and it Hurts Their Non-White Clients, WASH. POST (June 7, 2016),
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“unconscious, automatic responses that shape our conscious behavior.” 57
Implicit bias can be part of the reason that prosecutors choose to charge
some defendants and not others. Implicit bias can influence the plea
offers that prosecutors make.58 Bias is one reason that prosecutors may
have a hard time viewing defendants (and witnesses) who come from very
different backgrounds with empathy.59
The challenge with implicit bias in the criminal legal system is not
identifying where it might exist, but identifying how to break it down and
lessen its impact. Improved empathy skills may be one way to break
down implicit bias.60 When people are made aware of the fact that
everyone has implicit biases, that simple awareness can help to lessen
implicit biases.61 Empathy can also help people to move beyond seeing
those who are, for example, poor or racial minorities or mentally ill as an
“other” and instead to look at what they have in common and see their
shared humanity,62 which may help to stop unconscious, biased behavior.
How much does implicit bias impact plea bargaining?63 As with most
questions about plea bargaining, there is not a lot of data. 64 There have
been relatively few studies examining the impact of race on plea

https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/07/public-defenders-can-bebiased-too-and-it-hurts-their-non-white-clients/. For a discussion of judicial bias see Avital
Mentovich et. al., Are Litigation Outcome Disparities Inevitable? Courts, Technology and
the Future of Impartiality, 71 ALA. L. REV. 893, 903-12 (2020).
57. Elayne E. Greenberg, Bridging our Justice Gap with Empathic Processes that
Change Hearts, Expand Minds About Implicit Discrimination, 32 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 441, 448 (2017).
58. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 816 (2012)
(explaining how “in-group favoritism” may affect a white prosecutor’s ability to empathize
with a Black victim, thus affecting plea bargaining for the defendant).
59. See id.
60. See generally Greenberg, supra note 57 (arguing that “increas[ing] empathic
opportunities” will help debias the legal system).
61. See id. at 452 (“Unconscious, reflexive thinking such as implicit bias (also known as
System I thinking) can be mitigated by making people consciously aware of their reflexive
thinking.”).
62. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (1993).
63. See, e.g., Smith & Levinson, supra note 58, at 816–18. For a larger discussion of the
impact of bias on plea bargaining see Elayne E. Greenberg, Unshackling Plea Bargaining
from Racial Bias, 111 J. OF CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2021) (focusing on the impact of bias
on African American male defendants) (hereinafter Unshackling Plea Bargaining).
64. See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark:
The Need for Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 (2019)
(discussing the lack of data in all aspects of plea bargaining and how this prevents
meaningful reform).
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bargaining rates, from the 1980s and continuing into 2020. 65 What we do
know is that people of color serve more time in prison, and are more likely
to be sentenced to time in custody.66 Some studies have concluded that
African American and sometimes Latinx defendants are less likely to
plead guilty and more likely to go to trial leading to convictions and,
ultimately, experience worse sentences and greater sentence
disparities.67 One study found that white defendants got better deals
than African American defendants on first offenses and less serious
crimes and were more likely to get cases dismissed, charges reduced, and
no jail time in those cases.68
Bias might also impact how prior convictions are weighted and
viewed in plea bargaining. Prior convictions are a key fact in future plea
bargains and sentencing.69 A defendant with prior convictions can expect
to get a worse deal in the future, in addition to the other collateral
consequences of convictions.70 And, defendants who reject plea offers and
who are convicted at trial are more likely to receive higher sentences due
to the trial penalty.71 Interestingly, recent studies have found that the
biggest differences in plea rates happen with less serious crimes.72 One
concern is that prosecutors may be using race “as a [p]roxy for
[c]riminality” in these less serious cases. 73 In the absence of other
information, the concern is that prosecutors may be subconsciously using
race as a proxy for “a defendant’s recidivism potential and
dangerousness.”74
Another factor that leads to disparate outcomes in criminal cases is
whether a defendant is in custody during the pre-trial period. Those who
remain in custody are more likely to plead guilty and not have weak cases
65. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 56, at 5 (showing that just one of 34 empirical
studies of prosecutors and race examined the guilty plea stage). Two recent articles
specifically focus on plea bargaining. See Alexander Testa & Brian D. Johnson, Paying the
Trial Tax: Race, Guilty Pleas, and Disparity in Prosecution, 31 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 500,
504–05 (2020); Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1213–18 (2018).
66. Berdejó, supra note 65, at 1240–41 n.276.
67. See, e.g., Testa & Johnson, supra note 65, at 519–20.
68. Berdejó, supra note 65, at 1237–38.
69. See id.
70. See HERMAN, supra note 23, at 115–20 (discussing the impact of prior convictions
under the federal sentencing guidelines); see also National Inventory of Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, NAT’L REENTRY RSCH. CTR., https://niccc.national
reentryresourcecenter.org/ (last visited June 27, 2021).
71. See Testa & Johnson, supra note 65, at 520; see also supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
72. Testa & Johnson, supra note 65, at 521; Berdejó, supra note 65, at 1213–18.
73. Berdejó, supra note 65, at 1237–38.
74. Id. at 1238.
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dismissed.75 A study in Harris County, Texas concluded that 17% of those
detained pretrial who plead guilty in misdemeanor cases would not
otherwise have been convicted due to weaknesses in their cases. 76
However, staying in custody puts pressure on defendants to plead guilty,
especially if they will get a time-served offer and will be released from
custody.77 Overall, the Harris County study found that defendants
detained pre-trial on misdemeanor cases were “25% more likely to be
convicted and 43% more likely to be sentenced to jail.”78 This Harris
County study demonstrated that if a county relies on cash bail, not
surprisingly, poorer people are more likely to remain detained, as they
cannot post bail, and those who remain in detention are more likely to be
convicted.79
III. THE IMPORTANCE, AND POSSIBLE BIAS, OF THE FIRST OFFER
Negotiation literature discusses the power of the first offer. 80 It can
act to anchor the entire negotiation.81 This can happen even if the first
offer is high (or low). Stephanos Bibas has discussed how the first offer
can anchor plea bargaining and, due to overcharging, a defendant may
“jump at the deal” even when it might otherwise seem unreasonably
high.82 Jenny Roberts and Ron Wright found that prosecutors make the
first offer more often, so they are framing the entire negotiation.83
Notably, they found that prosecutors are even more likely to make the
first offer with misdemeanors.84 Arguably defendants have more leverage
in misdemeanor cases, as the trial penalty may not be as pronounced,
although whether a defendant is awaiting trial in custody changes that—
giving the prosecutor more leverage, particularly with time-served offers.
But, if prosecutors are more routinely making first offers in misdemeanor
75. See Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 785–86 (2017)
76. Id.
77. See id. at 717.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 736–37.
80. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The
Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 657,
657 (2001); Brian C. Gunia et al., The Remarkable Robustness of the First-Offer Effect:
Across Culture, Power, and Issues, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1547, 1547 (2013).
81. For a discussion of the anchor in the context of plea bargaining, see Jenny Roberts
& Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1455, 1483–87
(2016).
82. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2518 (2004).
83. Roberts & Wright, supra note 81, at 1486–87.
84. Id.
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cases, the power of the first offer and anchoring the negotiation may
counteract any advantage defendants might otherwise have.
In the context of plea bargaining, when prosecutors make the first
offer it can constrain all future plea negotiations between the prosecution
and the defense. It may make a prosecutor less willing to change their
initial assessment of the case. And, once they put the offer in writing, it
may be difficult within their office to bargain down to a lesser charge,
lesser sentence, or dismiss the case entirely. Second, once that initial
offer is made, it can constrain the ability of other prosecutors who handle
the same case to offer anything less so as to not second-guess a colleague.
In addition to a natural tendency to avoid contradicting a colleague in
favor of an adversary (the defense lawyer), there may also be particular
internal policies that make it difficult to offer less than what was offered
at the beginning of the case.
This difficulty to walk back from that first offer, particularly in less
serious cases,85 may exacerbate prosecutorial bias without any effective
tools to alleviate it. What if the first offer was a product of bias? What if
the prosecutor was unconsciously using race as a proxy for future
criminality? It is possible to train defense lawyers to be less susceptible
to the anchoring effect of a first offer,86 but this has minimal impact if
prosecutorial policies make it difficult to lower the offer once it has been
made.

85. Some prosecutors’ offices have had official policies that the first offer will be the
best offer. See, e.g., Alisson D. Redlich, et. al., The Influence of Confessions on Guilty Pleas
and Plea Discounts, 24 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 148, 155 (May 2018) (describing policy of
NY County District Attorney which had in 2014 a policy of making the “best first” offer).
See also Somil Trivedi & Jared Keenan, Coerced Out of Justice: How Prosecutors Abuse
Their Power to Secure Guilty Pleas, ACLU NEWS AND COMMENTARY (July 8, 2021)
(describing a recent law suit filed in Maricopa County, Arizona, detailing an example of
prosecutors being unable to even reoffer the first plea offer if the defendant doesn’t accept
it. Each plea offer included the following language: “The offer is withdrawn if the witness’s
preliminary hearing is set or waived. The offer may be changed or revoked at any time
before the court accepts the plea. Note: County Attorney Policy Dictates that if the
defendant rejects this offer, any subsequent offer tendered will be substantially harsher”).
For the class action complaint filed in the case, see https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/
legaldocs/yzdpxljwqpx/FINAL%20ACLU%20v%20Maricopa%20EDC%20Complaint.pdf.
More often, this is an informal practice. There are few formal policies, so it is unclear if the
first offer will be the best offer or if there are office policies discouraging better offers being
made by subsequent Deputy DAs handling a particular case. For example, the Los Angeles
District Attorney, under reforming DA George Gascon, has listed a series of policies, but
none specifically on plea bargaining practices, making it hard to know what the practices
or policies are. See Policies, L.A. CTNY. DIST. ATT’Y, https://da.lacounty.gov/policies (last
visited October 31, 2021).
86. See Roberts & Wright, supra note 81, at 1484.
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IV. POSSIBLE FIXES: STRUCTURAL AND INDIVIDUAL
It is important to acknowledge that these two proposals, without
other reforms, are limited in terms of what they could accomplish. The
criminal legal system in the United States is complex. Every state and
county is different.87 Laws vary from state to state. How prosecutors do
their job varies from office to office.88 Meaningful and widespread reform
needs legislative reform to reduce the prosecutorial power that is
embedded in existing criminal codes. One source of extraordinary
prosecutorial power is that prosecutors can choose to charge the same act
as a misdemeanor or felony, with or without enhancements.89 Bail reform
is also key to changing plea bargaining practices.90 There should also be
better regulation of prosecutorial behavior in plea bargaining to ban
routine hard bargaining practices like threats to add enhancements or
charges if a defendant rejects a deal or tight time limits on when a
defendant must accept a deal.91 Criminal legal reform must include
structural changes to reduce or eliminate mass incarceration by reducing
possible sentences on a full array of criminal charges.92 My suggestions
are not meant as a substitution for the serious changes above that are
needed to reduce mass incarceration and improve fairness in the criminal
legal system and in plea bargaining.93 But if blind assessment in initial
plea offers and empathy training are successfully implemented, these
suggestions could lessen the problem of bias in plea bargaining without
legislative reform, and without electing new prosecutors, although it
might take a change in leadership to acknowledge the need for these
changes in some offices.

87. Frequently Asked Questions: Federal and State Legal Systems, U.S. D EP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/faq (last visited Aug. 6, 2021).
88. See generally Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Motivations of State
Prosecutors, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1667 (2018) (discussing differences between prosecutors
in what motivated them to become prosecutors and how they approach their jobs);
Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge Movement and Theories of Prosecutors, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2007) (discussing how criminal code structures influence prosecutorial
decision-making).
89. See Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration, supra note 26, at
202–07.
90. See Heaton et al., supra note 75 at 736–37.
91. See Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining, supra note 30, at 424–27.
92. See Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration, supra note 26, at
205–07.
93. These proposals are also not meant to exclude other ideas to reduce bias in plea
bargaining, such as Elayne Greenberg’s suggestions for overall anti-bias reforms for both
prosecutors and public defenders. See Greenberg, Unshackling Plea Bargaining, supra note
63, at 40-49.
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A. Structural Fix: Blind Assessments For the First Offer
Reducing bias in the criminal legal system requires changes in how
the process works. Reform will be limited if it depends on the good will,
or better skills, of individual prosecutors. One idea for a structural fix to
reduce implicit bias is to make prosecutors “as blind as possible for as
long as possible” to the defendant’s race. 94 In other fields, blind
assessment has helped to reduce bias. 95 For example, when orchestras
required musicians to audition behind a barrier so they could not be seen,
and the only thing that could be heard was their music, hiring of women
increased.96 One study found reduced disparities when some litigant
attributes (but not all) were blinded in civil traffic infractions using
online dispute resolution.97 In a criminal context, blind assessment
requires removing anything that might indicate race or ethnicity,
including names, neighborhoods, descriptions of the defendant, and
police officer names when prosecutors are making decisions such as
charging and plea offers.98 In 2019, the San Francisco District Attorney’s
office adopted a policy of blind assessment in charging decisions. 99
Empathy training, as will be discussed in the next section, would also
support blind assessments and better exercise of prosecutorial discretion
when making plea offers.100 This article suggests that prosecutors go
further than blind assessment in charging, and make blind decisions
during at least the initial plea offer.101

94. Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Our Numbers Wrong? 33 AM. PSYCH. 1005, 1007
(1978).
95. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact
of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2000).
96. Id. at 716, 721.
97. Mentovich et. al., supra note 56, at 945-54. Litigant names and date of birth were
visible and gender could be discovered, but the litigants and judges communicated on an
online text/email type platform so their faces were not seen. Id. at 943. Interestingly, one
of the findings was the impact on age disparities with younger drivers paying higher fines
when the proceeding was face-to-face and not blinded by the online format. Id. at 948.
98. Alex Chohlas-Wood et al., Blind Justice: Algorithmically Masking Race in Charging
Decisions, STAN. COMPUTATIONAL POL’Y LAB, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
99. James Queally, San Francisco D.A. Unveils Program Aimed at Removing Implicit
Bias from Prosecutions, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-san-francisco-da-prosecutions-implicit-bias-software-20190612story.html.
100. See infra Section IV.
101. Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to
Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 72
(2015) (suggesting that blind assessment be used in both charging decisions and plea
bargaining).
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1. San Francisco Example:
In June of 2019, the then District Attorney of San Francisco, George
Gascón,102 announced that San Francisco would adopt “blind charging”
where prosecutors would evaluate what, if any, charges to file based on
information where race and other demographic information was
removed.103 San Francisco did this with the assistance of researchers
from Stanford University who created a “masking algorithm.”104 The
algorithm identified and masked five types of information: “[1] explicit
mentions of race; [2] select physical descriptors, including hair and eye
color; [3] individual[] names or nicknames; [4] location information,
including neighborhood names and street addresses; and [5] officer
names . . . .” 105 Under this new system, prosecutors first reviewed the
information based on the redacted report and made a preliminary
decision regarding what charges to file.106 Prosecutors then reviewed all
of the available evidence in a case, including unredacted reports (with
indicators of race), and made a final decision regarding charges.107 If a
prosecutor’s final decision was different they were required to explain, in
writing, why there was a difference.108 But, San Francisco’s blind
assessment did not apply specifically to plea bargaining; instead, it was
only applied to the charging decision.109
2. Importance of Blind Assessments for the First Offer
As discussed above, in plea bargaining the first offer can anchor the
negotiation. Prosecutors may be reluctant to change their first offer in
the absence of compelling information. And, when cases are handed off
102. George Gascon was elected District Attorney in Los Angeles County in November
2020, taking office in December 2020. See Associated Press, LA County DA George Gascón
Faces Blowback in the First Months of Launching Ambitious Slate Toward Criminal Justice
Reform, KTLA (Mar. 24, 2021, 10:37 PM), https://ktla.com/news/local-news/l-a-county-dageorge-gascon-faces-blowback-in-first-months-of-launching-ambitious-slate-towardcriminal-justice-reform/.
103. Timothy William, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate Than Whites. What if
Prosecutors
Didn’t
Know
Their
Race?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html;
‘Blind
Charging’ System Aims to Avoid Racial Bias in San Francisco, IRISH TIMES (June 14, 2019,
9:17 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/blind-charging-systemaims-to-avoid-racial-bias-in-san-francisco-1.3925597.
104. Chohlas-Wood et al., supra note 98, at 2, 3–5.
105. Id. at 2. Prosecutors are often familiar with individual police officers and the
neighborhoods they work in so removing their names helps to mask that information. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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to other prosecutors, there is a natural reluctance to second-guess a
colleague, and possibly office policies, making it harder for a defense
lawyer to significantly reduce the offer later in the case. The first offer,
or assessment, of the case is extraordinarily important for what happens
later. Prosecutors should take precautions to make sure their first offer
is not a product of bias. As was discussed above, this may be even more
important in less serious cases when race could unconsciously be used as
a proxy for future criminality. Adopting blind assessment policies could
be one way to make sure plea offers are not a product of bias.
3. What Should Be Part of the Blind Assessment?
As the San Francisco example illustrates, it is possible to remove all
information that could be indicia of race or ethnicity. However, to make
this structural change more meaningful, I suggest two additions. The
first is that prosecutors shift their presumptions in cases to move away
from a presumption that all cases that can be proven should be fully
prosecuted. Recent research on misdemeanor cases indicates that not
prosecuting nonviolent misdemeanors may decrease those defendants’
involvement in the criminal legal system in the future. 110 The decision
about whether to prosecute should be scrutinized, as it can be subject to
bias. Once a case is charged, there should be another check in the system
to decide whether to proceed. Currently, prosecutors often have to justify
why they have dismissed a case, instead of justifying why they have
decided to proceed forward.111 Prosecutors’ offices can decide, as a matter
of policy, to not prosecute certain kinds of cases—for example, low-level
marijuana cases.112 Why not switch the process and base it on race110. Amanda Agan et al., Misdemeanor Prosecution, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 5-6
(Mar. 22, 2021).
111. See, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 3:25-1(a). (“A complaint may be administratively dismissed by
the prosecutor without presentation to the grand jury, in which event said prosecutor shall
report the dismissal and the basis therefor to the Assignment Judge and shall notify the
defendant.”).
112. See, e.g., Alicia Victoria Lozano, Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office No Longer
Pursuing Charges Against People Arrested with Small Amounts of Marijuana, NBC PHILA.
(Aug. 6, 2018, 11:46 PM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/philadelphiadistrict-attorneys-office-larry-krasner-memo-no-longer-charging-for-small-amounts-ofmarijuana/57446/; Kyle Jaeger, Michigan Prosecutor Won’t Pursue Most Marijuana Or
Psychedelics Cases, ‘Regardless of the Amount’, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/michigan-prosecutor-wont-pursue-most-marijuana-orpsychedelics-cases-regardless-of-the-amount/; Caresse Jackman, Nashville DA Won’t
Prosecute Individuals for Possession of Small Amounts of Marijuana, NEWS 4 NASHVILLE
(July 1, 2020), https://www.wsmv.com/news/davidson_county/nashville-da-wont-prosecuteindividuals-for-possession-of-small-amounts-of-marijuana/article_f5ea474a-bbbd-11eaad1c-af102f59962f.html.
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neutral information? After a case is charged, there should be another
check in the process where if a different prosecutor is tasked with
deciding the first plea offer they should scrutinize the decision to proceed
with the case before moving forward.
Second, prosecutors should also have to explain and justify why they
are requesting jail or prison time in a given case. Most prosecutors grew
up with mass incarceration and their only professional experience was
during this decades-long era.113 Jail and prison time are now routine
sentences even for minor offenses.114 Societal messages tend to reinforce
that committing a crime should mean going to jail or prison—”if you can’t
do the time, don’t do the crime.”115 One way to start is to change the
assumptions that are built into the process.116 Instead of having to justify
a lack of jail or prison sentences, prosecutors should have to justify
seeking jail or prison time.117 What is accomplished by a jail or prison
sentence? Will it protect society? Is there some other goal? At this point

113. See, e.g., James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(July 20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-massincarceration (“The prison population began to grow in the 1970s, when politicians from
both parties used fear and thinly veiled racial rhetoric to push increasingly punitive
policies. Nixon started this trend, declaring a ‘war on drugs’ and justifying it with speeches
about being ‘tough on crime.’ But the prison population truly exploded during President
Ronald Reagan’s administration. When Reagan took office in 1980, the total prison
population was 329,000, and when he left office eight years later, the prison population had
essentially doubled, to 627,000.”).
114. See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020,
PRISON POL’Y I NITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
pie2020.html (“. . . low-level offenses account for over 25% of the daily jail population
nationally, and much more in some states and counties.”).
115. Lyrics from the theme song of the 1970’s detective television show, Baretta. SAMMY
DAVIS, JR., Baretta’s Theme (Keep Your Eye on the Sparrow) (1976).
116. Larry Krasner, the Philadelphia DA., tried to change the conversation by requiring
his prosecutors to detail prison costs during sentencing hearings. Bobby Allyn,
Philadelphia’s New DA Wants Prosecutors to Talk Cost of Incarceration While in Court,
NPR (Mar. 31, 2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/31/598318897/philadephiasnew-da-wants-prosecutors-to-talk-cost-of-incarceration-while-in-cou. But judges have often
resisted this type of change; see Samantha Michaels, Should Judges Have to Weigh the Price
Tag of Sending Someone to Prison?, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/01/judges-cost-incarceration-districtattorney-biberaj-krasner-boudin/.
117. Reforming prosecutors often find it hard to change the attitudes of the prosecutors
working for them, who are often entrenched in a more punishment-oriented approach. See
Tina Rosenberg, Can Prosecutors Be Taught to Avoid Jail Sentences?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/opinion/prosecutors-sentencing.html.
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we understand that sending people to prison is not rehabilitative.118
Prison should not be routine, but an exception.
4. Challenges
There are (at least) three challenges to adopting a policy of blind
assessments in first plea offers—how to treat prior convictions, juvenile
records, and prior contacts with police. Due to disparate treatment, and
more policing in communities of color, prior convictions may be a product
of bias and not a fair indicator of criminality.119 However, prosecutors
rely on prior convictions when assessing cases for plea offers (and for
charging).120 It might make sense to start by not including any prior
convictions during the initial plea assessment phase only with nonviolent misdemeanors. It is not realistic to mask all prior convictions in
felony cases where the prior conviction may be part of the charge through
an enhancement, or because of the nature of the charge itself. One
example is felony Driving While Intoxicated, which is based on a certain
number of prior convictions for the same offense to then charge as a
felony.
Theoretically, juvenile records should be sealed and not considered
once a juvenile becomes an adult. 121 In practice, juvenile rap sheets are
often part of adult rap sheets and are fully visible to prosecutors.122 Prior
convictions from juvenile cases should be removed from any information
a prosecutor views as part of the case assessment in all cases. It is well
documented that there are serious racial and ethnic disparities in how
juvenile cases are handled and who is brought into the criminal legal
system, instead of being disciplined at school.123 For this reason,
prosecutors should not see juvenile records when making their initial
118. See Diane Taylor, Prisoner Rehabilitation Does Not Work, Says Former Prisons
Boss, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
society/2019/oct/29/prisoner-rehabilitation-does-not-work-says-former-prisons-boss.
119. See Robin Symton, How Racial Segregation and Policing Intersect in America,
TUFTS (June 17, 2020), https://now.tufts.edu/articles/how-racial-segregation-and-policingintersect-america.
120. See Stacy Barrett, Use of Criminal Records in Charging and Sentencing, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/criminal-law/use-of-criminal-records-in-charging-andsentencing.html (last viewed Aug. 8, 2021).
121. See Lori Cohen, Should We Be Sealing Juvenile Court Records?, MST SERVS. (Aug.
23, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://info.mstservices.com/blog/sealing-juvenile-court-records.
122. See id.
123. See Joshua Rovner, Racial Disparities in Youth Commitments and Arrests,
SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
racial-disparities-in-youth-commitments-and-arrests/; Wendy Sawyer, Youth Confinement:
The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/youth2019.html.
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plea offer assessment. This policy supports the overall philosophy of
juvenile courts that juveniles should not be treated as adults and should
have a chance to rehabilitate themselves.
Just as juvenile records are often part of a defendant’s rap sheet,
prior police contacts, without convictions, are often included. 124 When I
first started practicing law I had to quickly learn to distinguish between
a conviction and a contact on a rap sheet. And, on more than one occasion,
I had clients with multiple police contacts that did not result in any
convictions. However, prosecutors tended to treat those defendants as if
they were not first-time offenders. The regular response from prosecutors
was “I can’t do that” when I questioned the deals and countered that my
client should get a standard first-time offender deal. I regularly was told
by prosecutors that, “it’s not like it is his first time in the system” as they
refused to reduce the offer. Multiple police contacts are a result of police
practices and focusing on certain neighborhoods and people. 125 A police
contact, without a conviction, should be masked so prosecutors do not see
them when evaluating cases for the first offer.
Finally, it may be difficult to adopt a policy of blind assessments with
more serious felony cases. With these cases, prosecutors often 5do not
make offers until later in the case processing. And, many of these cases,
such as murder and sexual assault cases, are vertically prosecuted. 126
This means that the same prosecutor will often handle the case from
beginning to end.127 Under these conditions, it can be harder to blind the
case. Part of the prosecutor’s case assessment in bringing charges, or
bringing a case to a Grand Jury, may include interviewing complaining
witnesses.128 There can be good reasons for this, such as the need to
gather more information, to make an initial plea offer later in the case.
In more serious cases, later offers can work to the advantage of the

124. See Criminal Records Can Follow a Youth into Adulthood, MST SERVS. (May 22,
2019 9:00 AM) https://info.mstservices.com/blog/criminal-records-youth (“As soon as a
juvenile comes into contact with law enforcement, a criminal record is opened on them, and
this record will contain every single document that is created by the police department,
court, district attorney and probation department in relation to the juvenile’s criminal
activity.”).
125. See, e.g., Dan Krauth, Racial Disparities in Policing Have Increased in New York
City, Data Shows, ABC 7 (Sep. 11, 2020), https://abc7ny.com/racial-profiling-disparities-inpolicing-black-arrests/6414274/.
126. See generally Andy Meek, ‘Vertical Prosecution’ to Enhance DA’s Casework,
MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS (Sep.
2, 2010), https://www.memphisdailynews.com/
news/2010/sep/2/vertical-prosecution-to-enhance-das-casework/ (“The difference between
horizontal and vertical prosecution is the difference between an assembly-line production
and a custom-made order.”).
127. See id.
128. See id.

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1356

11/11/2021 1:07 PM

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1337

defendant. It may make sense as a matter of policy to do blind plea
assessments only with misdemeanors and less serious felonies, cases
where an offer will be made at or before arraignment. Over 80% of all
cases going through the criminal legal system are misdemeanors, so
“just” focusing on misdemeanors alone could have far-reaching impact.129
B. Individual Fix: Empathy Training for Prosecutors
In addition to the systemic fix, this article also argues for empathy
training for prosecutors to reduce bias. This suggestion is made with the
recognition that it is impossible for prosecutors to be blind at every stage
of the criminal process to factors that could give rise to implicit or explicit
bias. Even if a prosecutor’s office adopts a policy of blinding cases before
making a first offer, it will be difficult, for reasons discussed above, to
blind all cases in the first offer phase of plea bargaining. In addition, the
initial charging decisions may not be made blind. Because prosecutors
have so much discretion, and because they can exercise discretion at
every stage of the criminal case, it is important to not only rely on blind
decision-making early in a criminal case, but also to recognize the
importance of tempering prosecutorial discretion with improved empathy
skills. In the context of plea bargaining, better empathy skills can
decrease bias when prosecutors are making the first offer when they are
aware of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, and gender. Better empathy
skills could also improve their overall assessment of cases in later plea
negotiations, and, of course, in initial charging decisions.
There are a variety of definitions of empathy. A cognitive definition
views empathy as an “intellectual ability enabling an individual to view
the world from another person’s perspective.”130 Defining empathy as an
“affective approach” means that a person is able to match their emotional
reactions to the emotional reaction of another.131 Another approach is
multidimensional, bringing the cognitive and affective approaches

129. See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE
UNEQUAL, (2018) (criticizing the misdemeanor system and the large number of people
charged every year, for data on the number of misdemeanor prosecutions (over 13 million
in 2015)); see id. at Appendix, page 251; ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND:
CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 229
(2018) (criticizing the large scale misdemeanor prosecution system that rarely adjudicates
cases and instead has adopted a “managerial model of judicial surveillance” that operates
more as a system of social control).
130. Emily Teding Van Berkhout & John M. Malouff, The Efficacy of Empathy Training:
A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 63 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 1, 1 (2016).
131. Id. at 1–3.
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together.132 Dispute Resolution scholar, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, gives
this well-known definition:
In empathy . . .we come to understand the situation of the other
by experiencing her emotion and understanding her experience
from her perspective, usually achieved by imaging oneself to be
in the position of the other (colloquially known as “standing in
the shoes” of the other, to which I would add, by taking the other
person’s feet).133
As will be discussed, prosecutors can benefit from the experience of
“standing in the shoes” of defendants or “taking [their] feet.” 134 Human
beings tend to be more empathetic to those who we see as like
ourselves.135 It is easier for us to imagine being in the shoes of someone
who is already like us in some way. We also tend to be better at
empathizing with individuals, not entire groups.136 This can extend to
having more empathy for those in the same group that we are from while
tending to have less empathy for groups of others or outsiders.
Discovering things that people have in common can help to create
empathy as it can build bonds and break down the feeling of the other
person being an outsider.137
Professionals with better empathy skills listen better and are less
likely to miss key pieces of information. Medical schools have started to
include empathy in their curriculum because empathetic doctors are
more efficient and accurate.138 Empathy is still not a topic that most law
school courses mention or teach.139 This means that lawyers, unlike
132. Mark H. Davis, Measuring Individual Differences in Empathy: Evidence for a
Multidimensional Approach, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH., 113–26 (1983) (describing
an Interpersonal Reactivity Index testing four scales that together measure empathy:
perspective taking, fantasy, empathetic concern, and personal distress).
133. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
385, 389 (1992).
134. Id.
135. P.J. Manney, Is Technology Destroying Empathy?, LIVE SCI. (June 30, 2015),
https://www.livescience.com/51392-will-tech-bring-humanity-together-or-tear-itapart.html.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Emily J. Gould, The Empathy Debate: The Role of Empathy in Law, Mediation, and
the New Professionalism, 36 VT. B.J. 23, 23 (Fall 2010).
139. One exception is legal clinical education which often includes discussions of
empathy. See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, When Students Lose
Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 135,
135 (“The authors suggest that empathic communication is a critical dimension of
lawyering and that without empathy, much valuable affective and cognitive knowledge
about the client’s case may be lost.”). Negotiation and dispute resolution classes also
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doctors, are usually left on their own to figure out how, or if, empathy
will be a part of the skills they bring to lawyering.140
Prosecutors charging a larger percentage of cases may be the primary
reason for mass incarceration in the United States.141 The unanswered
question is why did prosecutors start filing a higher percentage of cases
in the last several decades? One answer may be due to decreased
empathy and a tendency to see those arrested in a singular dimension:
as criminals deserving of punishment. Experience can help prosecutors
to develop empathy and make a difference in how they view cases and
what they think is an appropriate outcome.142 Life experience can make
prosecutors more “forgiving of mistakes” and increase the ability of
prosecutors to see themselves in those who are arrested. 143 However, this
ability is likely limited to those defendants that in some way “partially
resemble the life of the prosecutor or his social circle.”144
One criticism of the 2008 financial crisis was that bankers were not
prosecuted. A journalist who has examined this era observed that
prosecutors tended to
. . . essentially view executives as good people who may have
made a mistake, and they don’t want to put those people in
regularly include empathy skills training. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a
New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 29–30 (2012) (discussing
the skill of empathy as a part of better negotiation training).
140. E.g., Peter Reilly, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Mental Models: Theory that Leads to
More Effective Dispute Resolution, 10 NEV. L.J. 433 (2010). This is despite the recognition
that these skills matter dating back to at least 1955:
In 1955, Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold called upon the bar and the
legal academy to recognize the need for human relations training in law school.
Specifically, Griswold said that such training could help lawyers better understand
the emotional needs of both themselves and their clients; moreover, Griswold
suggested that the average lawyer spends far more time interacting
with people than reading and arguing appellate cases. Although the last three
decades have witnessed a marked increase in the number and variety of law school
courses offered in interviewing, counseling, mediation, and negotiation, (as well as
the number and variety of case books available to assist teaching those subject
areas), I would nevertheless argue that far more needs to be done in this area.
Moreover, I would suggest Professor Guthrie’s assessment from nearly a decade
ago still rings true today: “Lawyers are analytically oriented, emotionally and
interpersonally underdeveloped, and as adversarial as the legal system within
which they operate.
Id. at 449.
141. See John E. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. UNIV.
L. REV. 1239, 1242–43 (2012).
142. E.g., Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome,
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1110–11 (2014).
143. Id. at 1110.
144. Id. at 1111.
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prison. Suffice it to say, they don’t see young black males who are
dealing drugs as essentially good people making one bad
mistake.145
The ability to view executives as good people who made a mistake is
due to empathy. These executives generally come from the same socioeconomic class as prosecutors; they may remind individual prosecutors
of family or friends.146 Prosecutors may feel that bank executives are part
of the same group. By contrast, prosecutors are less likely to feel a
connection to a defendant who is a young, African American man with
limited formal education who may also may suffer from addiction or
mental illness. Without strong empathy skills, prosecutors are more
likely to focus on what is different and to see such defendants in a
singular light, as criminals, and make decisions about the case based on
that narrow view.147
1. Empathy and Bargaining
Better negotiators have strong empathy skills.148 Empathy can help
a negotiator to listen better, to understand their counterpart better, and
to gather more information.149 The better a negotiator understands the
other side, the more likely they are to have a successful negotiation.150
This understanding can help negotiators to work beyond stated positions
to understand the underlying interests. A prosecutor who understands
the defendant better will be more likely to offer a more appropriate
sentence. For example, if the prosecutor is aware that the defendant
suffers from mental illness or has a substance abuse problem, and
understands the impact of their situation, the prosecutor may want to
offer some sort of treatment program. And, if the prosecutor understands
the underlying interests of the defendant, they may be better able to offer
a deal that will be accepted. For example, if the prosecutor knows that
the defendant has children and wants to be able to see them grow up,
they may be able to better explain why some small amount of time in
custody is better than risking a larger amount of time after conviction at

145. FRESH AIR, Is the Justice Department Shying Away from Prosecuting Corporations?,
NPR (July 11, 2017, 2:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/07/11/536642560/is-the-justicedepartment-shying-away-from-to-prosecuting-corporations.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Schneider, supra note 139, at 29–30.
149. Id.
150. E.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 10 (2000).
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trial. Empathy in the context of negotiations can be seen as another form
of information gathering. In the context of plea negotiations, prosecutors
who gather more information and can view the possible plea deal from
the shoes of the other may make more appropriate plea offers.
Prosecutors (and defense lawyers) who do not have good empathy skills
will be less effective negotiators as they will have a tendency to negotiate
only from their own perspective and not thinking about how what they
want may not fit the needs and interests of the other side.
2. Training for Empathy
Empathy is a skill that can be taught.151 Empathy training can take
many forms.152 Empathy training programs use games, role plays,
lectures, skills training, and often a combination of all of these
approaches.153 Empathy training programs can be one hour or three days,
with no agreement about what is the recommended length for effective
empathy training.154 Empathy training may focus on cognitive, affective,
or multi-dimensional empathy.155 A review of empathy training studies
concluded that due to training, health professionals and university
students had increased empathy and better results.156 These results
suggest that prosecutors, who also have high levels of formal education,
might be in a group that is more likely to be receptive to empathy
training.157
Some scholars have criticized the limits of empathy and instead focus
on compassion.158 Psychologists researching in this area have focused on
two reactions. The first is “empathic distress,” which means that a person
may be so upset by understanding the negative feelings of another that
they want to withdraw from the situation.159 The second is compassion,
which is concern about another person’s situation that includes a desire
151. E.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Deeply Contacting the Inner World of Another:
Practicing Empathy in Values-Based Negotiation Role Plays, 39 WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL’Y
189 (2012) (discussing how to teach empathy in negotiation classes); Berkhout & Malouff,
supra note 129, at 1 (analyzing studies of empathy training and concluding that empathy
training programs are “effective overall”).
152. See Berkhout & Malouff, supra note 130, at 2–3.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. See id. at 2.
158. E.g., PAUL BLOOM, AGAINST EMPATHY: THE CASE FOR RATIONAL COMPASSION (2016)
(arguing empathy distorts judgement and that compassion will lead to better decisions and
less cruelty).
159. Tania Singer & Olga M. Klimecki, Empathy and Compassion, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY
R875, R875 (2014) (special issue).
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to help (and not withdraw). 160 Compassion is often discussed as a
component of empathy.161 One way to teach compassion is through
meditation and commonly through a technique called “loving kindness
training.”162 While there may be great value to moving to this next level
in training for all professionals in the criminal legal system, for the
purposes of this article, I am going to focus on empathy, with a
recognition that empathy training programs aimed at prosecutors should
be careful to not simply create an empathic distress response, which may
also bring a desire to withdraw, but instead should focus on how better
empathy skills can enable prosecutors to improve a situation, or at least
not make it worse.
3. What Kind of Empathy do Prosecutors Need?
Some prosecutors’ offices have started programs to improve their
attorneys’ empathy skills. On November 25, 2019, forty District
Attorneys around the country pledged to visit prisons, jails, and juvenile
detention centers and to incorporate visits into mandatory training and
job expectations.163 Prosecutors who understand more about what it is
like to serve time in prison or jail will have a better informed perspective
in deciding what charge or sentence is appropriate for individual cases. 164
In another program, the Manhattan District Attorney brought prisoners
and prosecutors together to learn from each other and to talk about the
criminal legal system.165 These and similar efforts help prosecutors to
interact with, speak with, and see more sides of the defendants they
charge and incarcerate. Prosecutors need more than just generic
empathy training to decrease their biases. They need training to better
understand what it is to be in the shoes of defendants pulled into the
criminal legal system in the United States. There are several specific

160. Id.
161. This is a point of debate among psychologists. E.g., Paul Bloom, Empathy,
Schmempathy: Response to Zaki, 21 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 60 (2017) (“I am
comfortable with Zaki’s use of ‘empathy’ as an umbrella term; he is right that this is a
common practice. However, my own usage, distinguishing empathy from compassion, is
also common.”).
162. Singer & Klimecki, supra note 159, at R876.
163. Justin Jouvenal, They Send People to Prison Every Day. Now, They Are Pledging to
Visit, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legalissues/they-send-people-to-prison-everyday-now-they-are-pledging-to-visit/2019/11/22/
5e0ff274-0d64-11ea-97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html.
164. Id.
165. Inside Criminal
Justice, INST. FOR INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION,
https://www.prosecution.org/inside-criminal-justice (last visited July 15, 2021).
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elements of empathy that should be covered in specific training for
prosecutors.
a. Impact of Prison/Jail
Defendants often serve time in jail, both before and after their
hearings, and prison in the United States. The 2019 prosecutor pledge to
visit prisons and jails as part of their training programs recognizes that
prosecutors should have some awareness of what jails and prisons look
like and what they are sentencing people to when there is time in
custody.166 These programs should not only walk prosecutors through the
jails, but should include a component of talking to inmates. The visits
should include discussions about the food, sleeping conditions, health
care, work, and educational or therapeutic programs (or lack thereof).
The programs should also include other basic information such as how
much it costs for inmates to telephone home and how in-person family
visits work.167 People in custody who stay in better contact with their
family are less likely to recidivate.168 Prosecutors should understand
when there are institutional barriers to maintaining these contacts, as
part of thinking about whether it makes sense to separate a defendant
from society and sentence them to time in custody. When prosecutors can
put themselves in the shoes of someone who is sentenced to time in
custody then they will be able to adequately think through whether it is
an appropriate sentence in a particular case.
b. Mental Illness
A significant number of people pulled into the criminal legal system
in the United States suffer from serious mental illness.169 On any given
day, Los Angeles County Jail or Cook County Jail are the largest mental

166. See Jouevenal, supra note 163.
167. E.g., Tyler Kendall, Why Are Jail Phone Calls So Expensive? CBS NEWS (Oct. 13,
2020, 7:07 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-are-jail-phone-calls-so-expensive/
(“Nationwide, the average cost of one 15-minute phone call from jail is $5.74, but that
amount can range as high as $24.82, according to the Prison Policy Initiative.”); Beatrix
Lockwood & Nicole Lewis, The Long Journey to Visit a Family Member in Prison, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/18/the-long-journeyto-visit-a-family-member-in-prison.
168. E.g., Meghan Mitchell et al., The Effect of Prison Visitation on Reentry Success: A
Meta-Analysis, 47 J. CRIM. JUST. 74, 74 (2016) (“Experiencing visitation resulted in a 26%
decrease in recidivism.”).
169. See, e.g., Criminalization of Mental Illness, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR.,
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/key-issues/criminalization-of-mental-illness
(last visited July 29, 2021).
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health institutions in the United States.170 Many mentally ill people cycle
in and out of jail because of the lack of services and support in the
community.171 They stop taking medication and end up with petty
offenses (such as trespass) and are brought into the local jail for some
days.172 In addition, being poor makes it harder to access mental health

170. E.g., Eric Westervelt, America’s Mental Health Crisis Hidden Behind Bars, NPR
MORNING
EDITION
(Feb.
25,
2020,
5:01
AM),
https://www.npr.org/
2020/02/25/805469776/americas-mental-health-crisis-hidden-behind-bars#:~:text=For%20
Decent%20Care-,New%20inmates%20with%20a%20mental%20illness%20arrive%20daily
%20in%20the,treatment%20facility%20in%20the%20country; see also Ailsa Chang,
“Insane”: America’s 3 Largest Psychiatric Facilities Are Jails, NPR (Apr. 30, 2018, 5:01 PM),
https://www.kcur.org/2018-04-30/insane-americas-3-largest-psychiatric-facilities-are-jails.
In many states, the largest mental health facilities in a state are the county jails: “In 44
states, a jail or prison holds more mentally ill individuals than the largest remaining state
psychiatric hospital; in every county in the United States with both a county jail and a
county psychiatric facility, more seriously mentally ill individuals are incarcerated than
hospitalized.” BACKGROUND PAPER, OFFICE OF RSCH. & PUB. AFFS., TREATMENT ADVOC.
CTR. (Sep. 1, 2016), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
backgrounders/smi-in-jails-and-prisons.pdf. For a discussion about Texas, see Dallas
Morning News Editorial, The Largest Mental Health Facility in Texas Shouldn’t be a Jail:
North Texas Needs a Psychiatric Hospital, DALLAS MORNING N EWS (Feb. 17, 2019),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2019/02/17/the-largest-mental-healthfacility-in-texas-shouldn-t-be-a-jail/ (“Sadly, when measured in terms of inmates who suffer
from mental illness, the Dallas County Jail is the second largest mental health institution
in the state, after the Harris County Jail in Houston.”).
171. E.g., H. Richard Lamb, et al, Treatment Prospects for Persons with Severe Mental
Illness in an Urban County Jail, 58 PSYCH. SERVS. 782, 782 (2007) (“Conclusions: A large
percentage of persons with severe mental illness received their acute psychiatric inpatient
treatment in the criminal justice system rather than in the mental health system. The
persons with severe mental illness in this study would present a major challenge in
treatment in any setting given their psychiatric and criminal histories. The resources of the
mental health system need to be greatly expanded, with priority given to treating persons
who are criminalized or who are in danger of becoming criminalized.”); see also Paul Tullis,
When Mental Illness Becomes a Jail Sentence, ATL., (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/12/when-mental-illness-becomes-jailsentence/603154/ (discussing the lack of mental health treatment in the community and the
impact of those who are incompetent to stand trial, and generally: “‘[t]he dream of a good
community mental-health system was not solved, and we went to the war on crime,
the war on drugs, and massive cuts to housing—and sentencing guidelines pushed
millions of individuals experiencing mental illnesses into the criminal -justice system,’
said Steven Leifman, a judge who has been closely involved with the handling of
individuals with mental illness in Miami-Dade County’s criminal-justice system for
the past 20 years.”).
172. One suggestion to stop this dynamic is to change who responds to calls of a person
in a mental health crisis, sending a professional who can help link people with services,
instead of the police. See Jackson Beck et al., Behavioral Health Crisis Alternatives: Shifting
from
Police
to
Community
Responses,
VERA
INST.
(Nov.
2020),
https://www.vera.org/behavioral-health-crisis-alternatives.
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services.173 Prosecutors should understand this dynamic. But, they
should also have a better understanding of the variety of mental illnesses
and the impact of those illnesses on a person’s life who suffers from them.
What is it like to have bipolar disorder? What is it like to have
schizoaffective disorder or manic depressive disorder? Often prosecutors’
experiences with these illnesses may be limited to learning how to
counter a defense that may raise them as a mitigating factor or as a claim
that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. This means that
prosecutors may be limited to understanding how mental illness invokes
questions of competency and should impact sentencing. Prosecutors need
a deeper understanding of how these illnesses can make a range of things
difficult, such as appearing for multiple court appearances or
maintaining housing and a job, particularly for someone who does not
have reliable access to medication or if medication does not work well.
c. Substance Abuse
As with mental illness, prosecutors should have training to
understand what life is like for those with substance abuse problems.
This should include meeting with those in recovery who have never been
in the criminal legal system. One goal is to understand that not every
addict is, or needs to be, pulled into the criminal legal system.174 Often
the most important factor that decides whether a person is arrested is
where that person lives—whether in a heavily policed community (which
tend to be communities of color) or a less heavily policed community.175
Ideally, this training would include information on what it is like to detox
in jail or prison, discussions with medical professionals who specialize in
addiction treatment, and meetings with families of addicts. 176
173. E.g., WILLIAM R. KELLY, FROM RETRIBUTION TO PUBLIC SAFETY: DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (Rowman & Littlefield eds., 2017) (“Data
from the National Alliance on Mental Illness indicate that 60 percent of adults with a
mental illness received no treatment services in the past year . . . [a]ccess to treatment is
largely a function of socioeconomic status.”).
174. Kara Dansky, Jail Doesn’t Help Addicts. Let’s Stop Sending Them There, ACLU
(Oct. 17, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/mass-incarceration/jaildoesnt-help-addicts-lets-stop-sending-them-there.
175. See Robin Smyton, How Racial Segregation and Policing Intersect in America,
TUFTSNOW (June 17, 2020), https://now.tufts.edu/articles/how-racial-segregation-andpolicing-intersect-america.
176. For a discussion of how the criminal legal system, through drug courts, fails to
follow medical advice, see CHRISTINE MEHTA, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., NEITHER JUSTICE
NOR TREATMENT: DRUG COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 18 (2017). See also U.S. Drug
Courts Fall Short of Delivering Medically-Sound, Effective Treatment, PHYSICIANS FOR
HUM. RTS. (June 7, 2017) https://phr.org/news/u-s-drug-courts-fall-short-of-deliveringmedically-sound-effective-treatment/ (“Drug courts regularly set participants up for failure.
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Prosecutors should also understand that the mentally ill often selfmedicate with controlled substances and how this unique (although not
unusual) dynamic brings ill people into the criminal legal system instead
of getting medical treatment.177 Finally, prosecutors should learn about
the challenge of treatment. They should learn that, for many people, it
takes multiple efforts, is not a linear process, and that relapse is not a
failure of will power.178
d. Poverty
Those living in poverty are much more likely to be pulled into our
criminal legal system.179 African Americans and Latinx have higher
overall poverty rates.180 Poverty is, on its own, a source of trauma. 181
Those who are poor are often arrested for poverty-related crimes such as
driving without a driver’s license (because they cannot afford the fees to
renew a license), or simple traffic tickets that convert to warrants when
they go unpaid.182 Criminal debt is a problem that has been well
Few communities have adequate treatment facilities, insurance plans often won’t finance
effective treatment programs, and the criminal justice objectives of drug courts often
overrule the medical needs of the patient in ways that threaten the rights and health of
participants.”).
177. The Need for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services for the Incarcerated
Mentally Ill, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Jan. 1, 2000), https://www.apha.org/policies-andadvocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2014/07/28/14/12/the-need-formental-health-and-substance-abuse-services-for-the-incarcerated-mentally-ill.
178. E.g., The Science Behind Addiction, NAT’L ASS’N OF ADDICTION PROVIDERS,
https://www.naatp.org/addiction-treatment-resources/understanding-addiction
(last
visited June 28, 2020) (“Those who embrace the view of addiction as behaviorally-focused
may also mistakenly believe that individuals misusing alcohol and drugs could, at any time,
‘make a decision’ to quit based upon good intentions and force of will. In fact, this is one of
the most widespread myths about addiction or SUD. Though a person taking drugs may
initially make a willful decision to engage in the behavior, we now know substance use
leads to brain changes over time. These brain changes interfere with an addicted
individual’s ability to deny themselves and resist the overwhelming compulsion to continue
with drug use”); How Addiction Hijacks the Brain, 28 HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER 1
(2011).
179. E.g., Melissa S. Kearney & Benjamin H. Harris, The Unequal Burden of Crime and
Incarceration
on
America’s
Poor,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Apr.
28,
2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Crime-blog-post_april28FINALv3.pdf (“America’s poorest families not only face higher risks of crime, but also face a higher
likelihood that a member of their family will be incarcerated.”).
180. See, e.g., John Creamer, Inequalities Persist Despite Decline in Poverty for all Major
Race and Hispanic Origin Groups, US CENSUS BUREAU (Sep. 15, 2020).
181. E.g., KELLY, supra note 173, at 56 (“Studies of urban minority individuals living in
poverty show rates of PTSD and trauma-related disorders four times that of the general
population.”).
182. E.g., Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day
Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV 486, 492 (2016) (describing the problem of incarcerating
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documented183 and yet prosecutors around the country continue to
routinely offer plea deals that include fines and refuse to dismiss lowlevel cases that will result in a variety of court-related fees along with
whatever fine there might be. 184 Prosecutors should be taught to
understand what poverty feels like and why what seems to be a minor
case and a minor punishment—”it is just a fine”—might be an
insurmountable obstacle to some.185 At this point it is well documented
that simple misdemeanor cases can lead to a downward spiral that can
be hard to recover from.186
e. Trauma
Criminologists recognize the significance of trauma as a cause of
criminal behavior.187 Problem-solving courts often focus on traumainformed care as part of their approach.188 Defense lawyers who
specialize in death penalty work often consider trauma a mitigating
factor for their clients.189

people who cannot afford to pay for fines and fees creating a “two-tiered system” where
“those who can pay their criminal justice debts can escape the system, while those who
unable to pay are trapped . . . .”).
183. See Sobol, supra note 182, at 492.
184. E.g., Whitney Benns & Blake Strode, Debtors’ Prison in 21st-Century America, ATL.
(Feb.
23,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/debtorsprison/462378/ (describing the variety of fines and fees routinely included in criminal
cases).
185. Dispelling
Myths
About
Poverty,
EQUAL
JUST.
UNDER
L.,
https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/poverty-myths (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
186. E.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 129, at 19–38.
187. See Vittoria Ardino, Offending Behaviour: The Role of Trauma and PTSD, 3 EUR.
J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY (2012); see also WILLIAM R. KELLY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE
CROSSROADS: TRANSFORMING CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 174–75 (2015).
188. See, e.g., Will Cushman, Why Trauma-Informed Care is Creating Hope for Kids in
Wisconsin, WISCONTEXt (May 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wiscontext.org/why-traumainformed-care-creating-hope-kids-wisconsin; Claudia Powell et al, Outcomes of a TraumaInformed Arizona Family Drug Court, 12 J. SOC. WORK PRAC. ADDICTIONS 219, 220 (2012)
(discussing a study that shows that trauma-informed care may be a good model for “parents
battling substance abuse”); see generally Nicole C. McKenna & Kristy Holtfreter, TraumaInformed Courts: A Review and Integration of Justice Perspectives and Gender
Responsiveness, 30 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 450 (2021).
189. In capital cases, competent assistance of counsel requires investigating mitigating
factors, which may include trauma. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); see also Miriam S.
Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense Can Reform
Sentencing, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2018) (arguing that defense lawyers in a wider variety of
cases should investigate their clients’ trauma and use that information to mitigate
sentences).
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Trauma can impact people in a variety of ways. The first pioneering
study to compile data on the impact of children being exposed to adverse
events was the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study.190 This
study had ten questions asking whether the patient had:
experienced enumerated ACEs, including verbal and physical
maltreatment, sexual contact with an adult, witnessing violence
against their mothers, and having parents addicted to drugs or
alcohol. Each affirmative answer was worth a point, and each
participant would be assigned an ACE score of zero to ten, based
on her responses.191
The more ACEs a participant reported, the more impact it had on
them as adults, including chronic depression, suicide attempts, addiction,
and other health problems.192 Since the 1990s when the ACE Study was
conducted, neuroscientists have learned that trauma “fundamentally
changes neurobiology, causing psychological symptoms and social
maladaptations.”193
Different communities experience different levels of trauma. African
Americans and Latinx are more likely than others, as children, to witness
a shooting, bombing, or civil unrest.194 They are seven times more likely
to lose someone close to them due to murder.195 Prosecutors need to
understand how different people are impacted at different levels by
violence in their communities. As Miriam Gohara observed, “[w]itnessing
assaults, robberies, shootings, and homicides scars children, hampers
their social development, and puts them at risk of committing violence
themselves.”196 Prosecutors should learn more about trauma rates in
their own communities, how trauma can contribute to criminal behavior,
and how it might create a barrier or challenge for rehabilitation. For
example, Prosecutors should know if any of the zip codes in their
jurisdiction are “Cradle to Prison Pipeline” communities.197 These are

190. See Gohara, supra note 189, at 14.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 15.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Marian Wright Edelman, The Cradle to Prison Pipeline: An American Health
Crisis,
4
PREV.
CHRON.
DIS.
(July
2007),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC1955386/#:~:text=The%20Cradle%20to%20Prison%20Pipeline%20consis
ts%20of%20a%20complex%20array,up%20to%20become%20productive%20adults.
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communities with higher trauma rates overall (including higher poverty
rates).198
f. Cognitive Disability
A significant number of defendants suffer from cognitive
disabilities.199 As with other areas, there is no comprehensive data, but
estimates are that between four and fourteen percent of those in the
criminal legal system have an intellectual disability.200 This is compared
to between two and three percent of the general population.201 They may
be barely literate (or completely illiterate). People who have cognitive
disabilities may not understand instructions that are given to them (and
may be more likely to be arrested for failing to follow a lawful order by a
police officer).202 People who have cognitive disabilities may also have a
much harder time finding and keeping a job, depending on the extent of
the disability. This can make it harder for them to both be released on
their own recognizance or raise bail. Not having reliable employment can
also make it harder for them to be able to afford fines and fees. Finally,
people with cognitive disabilities may have a hard time processing
information in a criminal case.203 They may not understand what they
are being told about a plea offer and they may need more time to process
the information.204 Prosecutors who have a better understanding of the
impact of these difficulties might be less likely to engage in hard
bargaining tactics, like short time limits on plea offers. They may also be
more realistic about probation conditions, to make sure they are not too
complicated. One challenge is that many defendants are never tested for
cognitive disabilities, so even their lawyers may not be fully aware of
what their clients’ abilities may be.
g. Other Disabilities
Defendants suffer from a full range of other disabilities. As the U.S.
population ages, more will be suffering from diseases such as dementia,
and prosecutors (as well as police officers) should be aware of how to

198. See generally Gohara, supra note 189.
199. KELLY, supra note 173, at 25.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Leigh Ann Davis, People with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice
Systems:
Victims
&
Suspects,
ARC
https://thearc.org/wpcontent/uploads/forchapters/Criminal%20Justice%20System.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
203. See id.
204. See id.
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better manage these disabilities.205 Prosecutors would benefit from a
better understanding of disabilities at every stage of a case processing.
When I was a public defender in Los Angeles I had a deaf client
charged with spousal battery as a misdemeanor. The prosecutor refused
to dismiss the case because “we can’t dismiss a spousal battery.” This was
a case that should never have been charged. My client and his wife were
having an argument. Since they were deaf, they were arguing with sign
language, not spoken words. At one point my client’s wife turned her back
to him. He grabbed her shoulder and turned her around and resumed
signing. When I asked him what happened he said, “I told her to listen to
me” (grabbing her by the shoulder so she could see him signing). When
the wife got on the witness stand to testify, the prosecutor asked what
happened and she said, “he told me to listen to him.” When the prosecutor
asked how he had done that, she replied “by grabbing my shoulder and
turning me to see him.” She denied he committed a battery. As a deaf
person, if she did not see my client signing, she could not listen to him. A
prosecutor with a better understanding of deaf culture would not have
prosecuted this single act (a grab on the shoulder) as the crime of spousal
battery. In another case, a misdemeanor failure to follow the lawful order
of a police officer, my elderly client had failed to stop when directed to do
so by a police officer (my client was walking down a street). When I asked
my client why he had not stopped, he said, “I didn’t hear him.” My client
had no prior record. We went to trial and my client, on the witness stand,
said that he had not heard the police officer. The prosecutor in the case
was in his first few months on the job. While cross examining my client,
he turned his back to my client and asked a question. My client said,
“What? I didn’t hear you.” Both of my clients were acquitted, but after
days in court and months of coming to and from the courthouse. Both
cases should never have been tried and likely would not have been by
more experienced or better trained prosecutors.206 Both of my clients
were Latinx, and both of the prosecutors in these cases were young white
men who had clearly had no experience with hearing impairments and
the deaf community.
Given the variety of disabilities that exist, it is not practical to train
prosecutors to have empathy for every disability they might encounter.
205. See Alzheimer’s Disease and Healthy Aging, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION https://www.cdc.gov/aging/publications/features/Alz-Greater-Risk.html (last
visited Aug. 5, 2021). For a story of poor training and a complete lack of empathy by police,
see Michael Levenson, Three Colorado Officers Resign After Arrest of Woman with
Dementia, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/us/coloradopolice-dementia.html.
206. See generally Wright & Levine, supra note 143 (discussing how newer prosecutors
tend to see their cases in more black and white ways and fail to recognize the grey areas).
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However, prosecutors are more likely to disregard the disability when the
disabled person is from a different racial, ethnic, or socio-economic group
than they are. 207 Some general training could help to make prosecutors
more aware that disabilities matter and are something to consider in
both charging and plea-bargaining decisions.
CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining is the dominant process for case resolution in the
United States criminal legal system.208 Any meaningful effort to reduce
racism and bias in the criminal legal system must include reform to
reduce racism and bias in plea bargaining. Plea bargaining as it works
now can exacerbate bias and reinforce structural racism. This article has
given two suggestions that should be included in overall reform efforts to
help lessen prosecutorial bias in the plea bargaining process. First,
prosecutors should use blind assessment to change the structure of how
they make plea offers, which will reduce the possibility for bias. 209 This
could have far-reaching impact, particularly in lower-level cases. Second,
prosecutors should improve their empathy skills, focusing on the
challenges and conditions that most commonly impact criminal
defendants.210 Meaningful reform demands that prosecutors learn to look
at defendants as full human beings deserving of compassion, not simply
punishment. Bias and racism can interfere with the ability to have
empathy for those who are different from ourselves and lead to disparate
outcomes. The only counter to this problem of bias is an intentional effort
to do things differently and to see those who are pulled into the criminal
legal system differently. Prosecutors, whose primary ethical duty is to do
justice211, should intentionally move away from single dimensional views

207. Police have time and again illustrated this bias. See, e.g., Rebecca Hersher, For
Parents of Young Black Men with Autism, Extra Fear About Police, NPR (Aug. 23, 2014,
6:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/08/23/342688183/for-parents-ofyoung-black-men-with-autism-extra-fear-about-police (“[P]eople with autism spectrum
disorders are seven times more likely to interact with police over their lifetimes, compared
with people without a cognitive disorder.”); Rachel Treisman, 13-Year-Old Boy with Autism
Disorder Shot by Salt Lake City Police, NPR (Sept. 9, 2020, 6:46 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/09/910975499/autistic-13-year-old-boy-shot-by-salt-lake-citypolice.
208. See supra Section I.
209. See supra Section III.A.
210. See supra Section III.B.
211. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.2(b) (4th ed.
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/Prosecution
FunctionFourthEdition/#:~:text=%28a%29%20The%20prosecutor%20is%20an%20adminis
trator%20of%20justice%2C,bounds%20of%20the%20law%2C%20not%20merely%20to%20
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of defendants as “criminals” and look at the full and complex human
being behind the criminal act.

convict (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law,
not merely to convict….”).

